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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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I. ADMIRALTY
THE UNITED STATES MAY EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
ON A "STATELESS" VESSEL WITHOUT SHOWING A NEXUS BETWEEN
THE VESSEL AND THE UNITED STATEs-United States v. Pinto-

Mejia, 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
A Coast Guard patrol observed a fishing boat, the Ricardo,
moving toward the United States coast with no flag. As the Coast
Guard approached, the Ricardo changed course seaward and
raised the Venezualan flag. A boarding party found approximately twenty tons of marijuana stored in the main hold. Defendants, the crew of the Ricardo, pled guilty to one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of 21
U.S.C. section 955a(a) (1982). After their conviction the crew
challenged the district court's jurisdiction on appeal, arguing that
(1) under the statute, the Ricardo was not "a vessel without nationality," see 21 U.S.C. section 955b(d) (1982); Convention on
the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 6, para. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
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T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, and (2) under international
law, even if the Ricardo was "stateless," the United States could
not exercise jurisdiction without showing a nexus between the Ricardo and the United States. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support
the finding of "statelessness." The court also rejected the defendants' nexus argument, stating that Congress was not limited by
international law and could regulate conduct outside the United
States. In enacting section 955a(a), Congress intended to reach
persons on "stateless" vessels who possess and plan to distribute
controlled substances in any country. The court reasoned that a
vessel which flies a national flag submits to that nation's exclusive
jurisdiction, and another state must shgw a nexus between itself
and the vessel to justify superseding that exclusive jurisdiction. A
"stateless" vessel, on the other hand, has refused to submit to any
jurisdiction and may not claim the protection of international
law. Therefore, Congress could regulate conduct on stateless vessels without violating international law. Significance-Thisinterpretation of section 955a(a) indicates that the United States need
not prove defendants' intent to distribute drugs in the United
States to prosecute drug dealers who use "stateless" vessels to
transport their goods.
II. ALIENS' RIGHTS
ALIEN RETAINS RIGHT TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDING AFTER RETURNING FROM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE PERMISSION TO DEPART
WAS STYLED AS AN "ADVANCE PARoLE"--Joshi v. DistrictDirector,

Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 720 F.2d 799 (1983).
Plaintiff alien Joshi petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from
an exclusion order issued by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). Joshi sought relief after he returned to the United
States from a departure, authorized by the INS, to resume his
application for an adjustment of status to permanent resident.
The Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to deny Joshi the
procedurally favorable deportation proceedings was affirmed by
the District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court

held that by giving Joshi permission to leave the United States in
the form of an advanced parole, the INS changed his status to a
paroled alien subject to exclusion. The Court of Appeals for the
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Fourth Circuit vacated the exclusion order and remanded the
case, holding that the grant of advance parole status to an alien
who receives INS authorization to leave the United States and
who later returns to resume a pending application for change of
status, will not affect the alien's right to deportation proceedings.
The court reasoned that an alien who is granted INS permission
for his departure, who is absent from the country for a brief period of time, and whose departure is "unintended or innocent and
casual," meets the requirements of 8 C.F.R. section 245.2(a)(3)
(1968), which permits the alien's application for permanent resident status to be adjudicated without regard to applicant's previous departure. Advance parole aliens are subject to exclusion proceedings only if the alien receives this status prior to entry or the
alien seeks entry because of emergency or public interest. Significance-This decision is the first to determine the type of hearing
accorded to aliens who obtain INS permission to depart from the
United States and who later return to resume a pending application for change of status.

No

VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN EQUIPMENT LOCATED

IN

UNITED

STATES

RECORDS

TRANSNATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICA-

TIONS-United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1983).
An informant for the Drug Enforcement Agency made recorded
telephone calls to drug dealers in Italy and offered to sell them
heroin. The Italians were arrested after they voluntarily came to
the United States, took government-supplied heroin samplers,
and made a partial payment to government agents. The Italians
claimed that the recording of their conversations violated the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948,
United States-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. 1965. The trial court
disagreed, and the appellate court affirmed the decision, following
United States v. Catroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975). Even
though such a recording is illegal under Italian law, the recording
equipment was set up in New York, and United States law applies. Pursuant to the Friendship Treaty terms, the Italian defendants were accorded all the rights that United States citizens
would have in similar circumstances. Significance-This case establishes that no violation of foreign sovereignty exists when wire
tapping is done or telephone recordings are made by means of
equipment located in the United States.
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III. ANTITRUST
UNITED STATES MANUFACTURERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER

4

OF THE CLAYTON ACT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM A
CONSPIRACY OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS TO SELL COMPARABLE
SECTION

PRODUCTS AT ARTIFICIALLY HIGH PRICES IN THEIR HOME MARKET
AND AT PREDATORY PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES-In Re: Japa-

nese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319 (3d

Cir. 1983).
Defendants, Japanese television manufacturers, allegedly conspired to sell television sets at artifically high prices in Japan
while using excess manufacturing capacity and supercompetitive
profits earned in their domestic market to sell comparable products at substantially lower, predatory prices in the United States.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit admitted evidence
supporting a finding that (1) Japanese producers sold televisions
in the United States for losses as great as twenty-five percent; (2)
a Japanese trade organization, of which the defandants were
members, had "allocated" customers by limiting each manufacturer to five United States merchandisers; and (3) the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had set industry-wide minimum prices on televisions distributed in the
United States to avoid confrontations with United States antidumping policies. In a pretrial in limine hearing, the district
court ruled that much of the plaintiffs' evidence was inadmissable. The court subsequently granted summary judgment
to the defendants because the plaintiffs could not establish that
the defendants had conspired to price predatorily in the United
States television market. The court of appeals reversed in part
and remanded, holding that a conspiracy to yield monopoly rents
from Japanese consumers while affecting long-term, below-cost
sales on comparable goods in the United States would support
liability to injured United States plaintiffs under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. The court of appeals determined that the minimum
prices required by MITI could support a finding of a "collusive
establishment of dumping prices" which indicates a predatory
strategy to injure domestic television manufacturers. The self-imposed five-customer limit was, as a matter of law, a mechanism to
eliminate competition among the Japanese by permitting the concentration of their competitive energies on United States firms.
Significance-The case holds that a conspiracy to fix prices in a
foreign market and the simultaneous below-cost sales of
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equivalent merchandise in the United States creates an antitrust
cause of action for the injured United States manufacturers under
section 4 of the Clayton Act.

IV. ARBITRATION
ANTITRUST CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS ARE
NOT ARBITRABLE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND

ENFORCEMENT ON FOREIGN ARBITRAL

AWARDS-Mitsubishi Motors

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir.
1983).
Plaintiff Mitsubishi Motors brought suit in United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, claiming various
breaches of a sales contract between itself and defendant Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, an automobile distributor. Mitsubishi also
petitioned for an order compelling arbitration of the claims in
compliance with a provision of the sales contract. Soler counterclaimed, alleging antitrust violations. Soler argued that the antitrust issue was nonarbitrable, pursuant to the judicial policy that
all antitrust issues should be judicially determined. The district
court ordered arbitration of all claims and counterclaims, relying
on Sherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), in which the Supreme Court refused to extend to an international case a domestic policy that excludes securities fraud claims from arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. The court
analyzed the language of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and concluded that antitrust
matters are not "capable of settlement by arbitration," within the
meaning of Article II(1) of the Convention. The court of appeals
distinguished Sherk, which did not rely upon an analysis of Article II, and noted the important difference between securities laws,
which protect a small group of investors, and antitrust laws,
which protect the general public. Concluding that this difference
justified denying arbitration of the international antitrust claims,
the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether these claims should be stayed pending the
outcome of the arbitrable issues. Significance-This decision is
the first to extend to international agreements the domestic policy that excludes antitrust issues from arbitration.
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V. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A FOREIGN STATE AS DEBTOR CANNOT ASSERT THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE, NOR CAN THE LOAN AGREEMENT BE CONSIDERED AN EXCHANGE CONTRACT WITHIN ARTICLE VIII, SECTION

2(B) OF THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT-Libra Bank Ltd. v.
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

The plaintiff banks, participating in an international loan made
to a bank wholly-owned by the Costa Rican Government, sued to
recover the principal and interest of the unpaid loan and sought
return of assets previously withdrawn for attachment. The banks
asserted that a resolution adopted by the Central Bank of Costa
Rica authorized repayment of external debts to multilateral international agencies only, and thus prohibited repayment of the loan
to plaintiffs. The defendant bank also claimed that the act of
state doctrine prevented the court from granting the plaintiffs'
order. The court, however, held that the act of state doctrine did
not apply because debt was sited in New York. The court reasoned that although the foreign state as debtor could refuse to
repay the loan, it had accepted as conditions of the loan agree-

ment the jurisdiction of the court, the application of New York
law, and repayment through a New York bank. After determining
that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable to the instant situation, the court examined the validity of the Costa Rican resolution. Finding that the resolution was inconsistent with the policy
and law of the United States, the court refused to give effect to
the Costa Rican decree. The defendant's contention that the loan
agreement was an exchange contract unenforceable under article
VIII, section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement was rejected.
The court concluded that an international ban is not an exchange
contract within the meaning of article VIII of the Agreement.
Moreover, even if the loan agreement was construed as an ex-

change contract, the defendant had failed to show that an intervening currency regulation would not render the loan agreement
unenforceable, or that the resolutions were imposed consistently
with the International Monetary Fund Agreement. Significance-The decision evaluates the applicability of the act of state
doctrine and the Bretton Woods Agreement to international loans

on which a foreign state has defaulted.
CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE UNDECLARED WAR IN NICARAGUA AND NICARAGUAN CITIZENS' TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED
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STATES

GOVERNMENT

ARE

NONJUSTICIABLE

POLITICAL

QUES-

TIONS-Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C.
1983).
Members of Congress, citizens of Nicaragua, and Florida residents brought suit against the Reagan Administration, challenging the President's constitutional authority to wage an undeclared
covert war against Nicaragua. The Congressional plaintiffs alleged
that United States-sponsored terrorist raids against Nicaragua violated the Boland Amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropriations Act and congressional authority to declare
war under article I, section 8, cl. 11 of the Constitution; neutrality
laws; and the War Powers Resolution. The Nicaraguan plaintiffs
sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by the United
States-sponsored raids and an injunction prohibiting further
United States involvement in Nicaragua. The district court, applying Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the action, holding that the case raised nonjusticiable political questions and that judicial resolution of plaintiffs' claims would interfere with the constitutional war powers of
the executive and legislative branches. The court refused to delineate the scope of the president's power to conduct foreign policy
in Central America because the court lacked the necessary resources to discover the level of CIA involvement in Nicaragua. To
side with either the President or Congress in a dispute over policy
in Central America would express a lack of respect by the Judiciary for a coordinate branch of government, and judicial resolution
of the controversy would increase the danger of inconsistent policy pronouncements upon a diplomatically sensitive matter,
United States military involvement in Nicaragua. Significance-This decision marks the judiciary's revival of the political
question doctrine to avoid review of presidential military initiatives in Central America.
VI.

LABOR RELATIONS

THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT DOES NOT HAVE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS WHO
WORK

FOR

UNITED

STATES

COMPANIES

IN

FOREIGN

COUN-

TRISS-Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 573 F. Supp. 458 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
Plaintiff, a United States citizen, was employed by the Win.
Wrigley, Jr. Co. (Wrigley) from 1974 to 1978, and by Deutsche
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Wrigley, GmbH, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wrigley, from 1978
until he was dismissed in 1983 at age 65. During his employment
with Deutsche Wrigley, GmbH, plaintiff resided in Munich, West
Germany and performed virtually all of his work-related duties
outside of the United States. Plaintiff claimed that the decision
to discharge him was based on his age and, therefore, was in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. section 623. Defendant denied that the termination was
based on age and moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the ADEA was inapplicable to United States citizens employed in a foreign country. The district court granted the motion
for summary judgment, holding that the ADEA does not apply to
United States citizens employed by United States companies in
foreign countries. Citing Cleary v. United States Lines, 555 F.
Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), and Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co.,
567 F. Supp. 1453 (D.C. Colo. 1983), the court noted that Congress did not intend the Act to have extraterritorial application.
To support its finding the court pointed to the incorporation into
the ADEA of the foreign jurisdiction exemption contained in the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. section 213(f). The
court reasoned that because FLSA exempts from jurisdiction any
employee who works during the regular business week within a
foreign country, such an employee is also exempt from the ADEA.
The court also rejected plaintiff's claim that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000(e), which is construed
to apply extraterritorially, was more analogous to the ADEA and
therefore mandated its extraterritorial application. Significance-This is the first case in which the Seventh Circuit has
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not
apply extraterritorially, and it affirms the district court's holding
in Cleary that Title VII does not control the application of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to United States citizens
working for United States companies in foreign countries.
VII. SECURITIES
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION EXISTS WHEN FOREIGN CITIZEN
SUFFERS LOSSES IN UNITED STATES COMMODITIES MARKETS DUE TO
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE OUTSIDE THE UNITED
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v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., No. 83-7178 (2d
Cir. filed Nov. 28, 1983).
STATES-Psimenos

Plaintiff, John Psimenos, a Greek citizen, sued E.F. Hutton &
Company pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. section 1 (1982), for damages resulting from E.F. Hutton's allegedly fraudulent procurement and
management of his commodities trading account. E.F. Hutton, a
Delaware corporation, acquired Psimenos as a client when the
company's European representatives allegedly misrepresented the
nature of the commodities trading E.F. Hutton would perform on
plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff claimed that as a result of the mishandling of his account, he suffered heavy losses on the United States
commodities markets. The district court dismissed plaintiff's
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that although the trading occurred within the United States, the alleged
fraud was "predominantly foreign" and thus was not within the
scope of the Commodities Exchange Act. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claim. The commodities transactions on
the United States markets substantially furthered the alleged
fraud and therefore constituted conduct sufficient to establish
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reiterated the position it had adopted in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In that case the court
held that subject matter jurisdiction for Securities Act violations
exists when the conduct within the United States "directly
caused" the plaintiffs' losses. In the instant case the court of appeals found that because Psimenos' losses resulted from the
United States commodities trading, subject matter jurisdiction
exists under the Commodities Exchange Act even though the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations occurred abroad. Significance-This decision establishes that trading in United States
commodities markets is sufficient to confer on a federal district
court subject matter jurisdiction of a claim for damages brought
by an alien pursuant to the Commodities Exchange Act.
FOREIGN SECURITIES SELLER SUBJECT TO IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION BASED ON CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOMESTIC PURCHASER;

rum Non Conveniens DOES NOT APPLY: FOREIGN

Fo-

ARBITRATION
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CLAUSE IN SECURITIES CONTRACT ENFORCEALE-Pioneer Proper-

ties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Kan. 1983).
A corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas invested in Canadian real estate joint ventures and later sued the
Canadian promoter of the ventures, alleging violation of section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 77 1 (2), and
rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78(j). Although the parties disputed where the contract for
sale of the securities was made, both agreed that for a period of
years the defendant had made telephone calls and had written
letters to the plaintiff in Kansas concerning the joint venture.
Plaintiff premised jurisdiction on section 22 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. section 77(v), and section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
section 78(a)(a), which allow service of process wherever the defendant may be found, provided plaintiff sues in a proper forum.
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction because the transaction had only incidental
contacts with Kansas, and urging dismissal on the alternative
grounds of forum non conveniens. Alternatively, defendant
sought to stay the proceeding pending arbitration in Canada pursuant to the contract. The district court cited Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972), and held that it had in personam jurisdiction, reasoning
that the broad grounds for actionability under rule 10b-5 encompassed the continuing communication from defendant to plaintiff
and was, therefore, a purposeful act by which defendant subjected himself to jurisdiction. The district court also found that
because there was legislative intent to give plaintiff broad discretion to choose the forum, the forum non conveniens doctrine was
not available to defendant. The district court did grant a stay to
arbitrate, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. section 1. Although the nonwaiver provisions of the securities laws
ordinarily would have invalidated the arbitration clause, the court
applied Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), holding
that the Arbitration Act takes precedence over the nonwaiver
provisions where there is a "truly international" securities transaction. Significance-First,this is the first case in which a course
of correspondence alone has supported in personam jurisdiction
over a foreign seller of securities. Second, although Scherk had
involved a multinational transaction, the district court applied
the Scherk "truly international" standard to enforce an arbitration clause in a securities transaction occurring entirely within
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two countries.
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO WAIVE Swiss BANK SECRECY IN INSIDER
FRAUD PROSECUTION RESULTS IN ADVERSE INFERENCE THAT SWISS

BANK ACCOUNT EXISTs-SEC v. Musella, [Current Volume] FED.

SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

99,516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1983)_

In a securities fraud action, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the SEC's request to require one of
the defendants to execute a waiver of Swiss bank confidentiality.
When the defendant refused to execute the waiver, the court held
him in civil contempt. The court also granted the SEC's motion
for a coercive sanction, drawing, as trial court, an adverse factual
inference that defendant had an account with a Swiss bank. Rejecting as insubstantial the defendant's constitutional due process, privacy and self-incrimination claims, the court reasoned,
"[b]ecause it is logical to assume that a refusal to give a voluntary
waiver is triggered by the existence of the

. . .

account

. .

.,the

drawing of an adverse inference constitutes an appropriate remedy." FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at

99,516. The court added that

defendant could cure any hardship by agreeing to permit appropriate inquiries in Switzerland. Significance-The decision is the
first to apply the adverse inference sanction to Swiss bank secrecy
in a securities fraud case.
VIII. TRADE REGULATION

THE 1953 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION
WITH JAPAN DOES NOT BAR AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE
ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1916-In Re: JapaneseElectronic Products

Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319 (3rd. Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs, Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Electric Corporation, brought suit against several Japanese and American electronics corporations alleging that defendants engaged in
illegal dumping in violation of the Antidumping Act of 1916 (1916
Act), 15 U.S.C. section 72 (1976). Zenith claimed that consumer
electronics products (CEPs) were selling in the United States at
prices below those charged in Japan. The 1916 Act makes it illegal to "import, sell, or cause to be imported or sold ... articles

within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market or wholesale price of such articles ... in the principal markets of the country of their production . . .: Provided,
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[t]hat such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or
injuring an industry in the United States .

.

.

."

The district

court granted partial summary judgment against plaintiffs, after
determining that the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation with Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, did not
bar plaintiffs' dumping claims under the 1916 Act. The Treaty
provides that Japanese products offered for resale in the United
States shall be afforded "national treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use." The defendants argued that application of the 1916 Act to Japanesemade CEPs sold in the United States discriminates against those
goods in violation of the Treaty. The district court, however, reasoned that CEPs sold in the United States were not sufficiently
comparable to those sold in Japan to come within the purview of
the .1916 Act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision concerning the Treaty and held that
the application of the 1916 Act did not discriminate against the
CEPs in violation of the Treaty. It noted that the Treaty does not
require that Japan's goods be given identical treatment by the
United States, only that they be accorded "national treatment."
The court of appeals, however, rejected the finding that the CEPs
sold in the United States and those sold in Japan were not sufficiently comparable to violate the 1916 Act. Finding no "legally
significant" difference that would distinguish the products, the
court also determined that there was sufficient evidence to raise
issues of material fact regarding the defendants' alleged pricing
practices and the specific intent required by the 1916 Act. Significance-This case highlights some of the complex antitrust issues
arising in United States-Japanese trade practices under the 1916
Act and sets forth the standards used to analyze those questions.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROHIBITING PAYMENT TO IRANIAN BANK
OF INTERNATIONAL STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT is VAID-Rockwell

Int'l Systems v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff, Rockwell International, contracted with the Iranian
Ministry of War to build a communications system in Iran.
Rockwell secured its performance with guarantees issued by the
Iranians' Bank and backed by two standby letters of credit from
Citibank which were in favor of the Iranian Government. After
the Iranian Revolution, the Iranians' Bank's successor, Bank
Tejarat, called for Citibank's payment of the letters of credit because Rockwell had not completed its contract. Rockwell sought
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and obtained a preliminary injunction in district court enjoining
defendant Citibank from paying Bank Tejarat's demands under
the letters of credit. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, upholding the preliminary injunction because (1)
the Hague Tribunal probably would not hear the case, thereby
causing Rockwell to suffer irreparable harm; and (2) Rockwell was
likely to succeed on the merits by claiming that the Iranian Government had acted fraudulently in calling the letters. Significance-The decision demonstrates the federal courts' willingness
to grant a preliminary injunction when a foreign government calls
in bad faith for payment of letters of credit.

